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R. Scott Sheffield 
According to the records of the Indian Affairs Branch, j u s t over 3 ,000 S t a t u s Indians 
voluntarily enlisted in the military forces of 
Canada during the Second World War. Of these, 
213 were killed. ' These and an unknown number 
of other non-s ta tus Indian, Métis and Inuit men 
served in all three military branches, and in every 
theatre where Canadian ground, sea and air forces 
fought. However, virtually nothing is known of the 
military service performed by Canada ' s Native 
population. In part, this reflects the paucity of 
records available on Native soldiers. Personnel 
files did not include any mention of ethnicity and 
thus it will never be known exactly how many 
Aboriginal men served. The figures of the Indian 
Affairs Branch are suspect, only partial, and do 
not account for Métis, Non-Status Indians, or 
Inuit; nor do they include those conscripted under 
the National Resources Mobilization Act for 
service in Canada. Historians have tended to focus 
either on the operational side of the conflict, or 
on the political, social and economic upheaval of 
the home front. The recruitment and military 
se rv ice of t h e Abor ig ina l p o p u l a t i o n fits 
somewhere in between, and h a s been nearly 
forgotten. 
There have been two works published on the 
topic of Native military experience in Canada 's 
wars: Forgotten Soldiers, by Fred Gaffen, and a 
Ve te rans ' Affairs pub l i ca t ion tit led, Native 
Soldiers Foreign Battlefields.2 Unfortunately, 
both these s tudies place greater emphasis on 
Opposite: Native Chief and Girl, 29 September 1942. 
(NAC PA 129070) 
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anecdotes ra ther t h a n analysis , leaving our 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Nat ive m i l i t a r y se rv i ce 
incomplete. J ames W. St. G. Walker, has written 
an excellent article on the recrui tment of visible 
minorities during the First World War, which gives 
a description of Native recruitment and military 
service.3 As yet, no comparable work h a s been 
conducted on the Second World War. In an attempt 
to fill this gap in the historiography, this essay 
will examine the recruitment policies of the three 
branches of the armed forces as they affected 
Aboriginal men, and set parameters on die types 
of military service open to Canada's First Nations. 
While many factors combined to determine the 
na tu re of Aboriginal contr ibutions to the war 
effort, recrui tment policy played a key role in a 
process that funnelled the vast majority of Native 
enlistees into the Army. 
Despite the existence of a large naval service, fewer First Nations men enlisted in the Royal 
Canadian Navy (RCN) than any other b ranch of 
the service. At the outbreak of hostilities, die Naval 
Service maintained an explicit racial barrier, or 
"colour line," in official recrui tment policy tha t 
required personnel to be of "Pure European 
Descent a n d of the White Race" before an 
appl ica t ion would even be accep ted . 4 This 
regulation officially blocked Aboriginals from the 
naval service. 
The motivations for this flagrantly racist 
restriction were outlined by the Commanding 
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Officer, Pacific Coast (COPC) in a report on the 
quest ion of Native naval service on the British 
Columbia coast.5 The COPC concluded that: 
Although it is considered that there is much 
excellent material among the Indians on the B.C. 
Coast, it is strongly recommended that all Royal 
Navies should still maintain the strict rule that 
personnel must be of 'Pure European Descent 
and of the White Race. '6 
The repor t suppl ied th ree r e a s o n s for th is 
recommendation, the first of which was purely 
racial in character. It was believed tha t "The 
confined living spaces of a naval rating do not 
lend themselves to satisfactory mixing of the white 
races with Indians."7 The close quarters of naval 
service, therefore, precluded the adoption of Army 
and RCAF enlistment regulations that allowed for 
Native r e c r u i t m e n t . The second a r g u m e n t 
involved the legal restrictions on Aboriginal access 
t o i n t o x i c a n t s i n t h e u n r e g u l a t e d n a v a l 
environment where drinking was prevalent and 
even encouraged.8 While this problem could arise 
in the other services, only the RCN still issued a 
daily r u m ration, or grog, to its personnel. The 
COPC felt certain that "bad feeling would ensue 
should differentiation of the supply of "Grog" be 
made between the white man and the Indian."9 
The third point attempted to dispel the relevance 
of the fact that Britain's Royal Navy (RN) employed 
"Chinese, Maltese, and Guernese" in their ships.10 
These men were "only accommodated in big ships 
and then used in special capacities as officers' 
stewards and servants. They also mess separately 
from the white ratings. "*1 The RCN was essentially 
a small ship navy in 1941, and did not have any 
capital ships where this limited service by non-
white rat ings could be accommodated. These 
reasons were sufficient for the Navy to turn down 
any request for Native access to the naval service. 
To these arguments could be added a fourth, 
ra ised b u t not expanded on in the report ' s 
recommendation. The COPC strongly advised that 
the RCN should maintain the strict "colour line" 
of all Royal Navies, including those of Australia, 
New Zealand, a n d mos t important ly , Great 
Britain. The Dominion navies all had a common 
paren t organisation in the RN, from whence 
common traditions, regulations and doctrine were 
derived. It is difficult to overstate the importance 
of t h i s l ink w h e n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e RCN's 
unwillingness to remove the "colour line" from 
its recruiting restrictions, as the transfer of vessels 
10 
and personnel between British and Canadian 
service was commonplace. The pressure to fit into 
this larger s t ruc ture certainly reinforced the 
RCN's inclination to preserve its white Anglo-
Saxon nature.12 
The RCN m a i n t a i n e d the "colour l ine" 
throughout the first half of the war, apparent ly 
with very little debate or opposition. It was able 
to do this in par t because the Navy was the 
smallest of the three services, with 92,441 all 
ranks at its peak strength in J anua ry 1945.13 As 
well, the RCN's casualty rate was not as heavy a 
drain, allowing the Navy to be more selective in 
its recruiting. With little pressure or need to alter 
its racial ban, it was not until 1943 that the RCN 
officially changed its policy. 
On 12 March 1943, at the behes t of the 
Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, 
the Committee of the Privy Council p a s s e d 
Resolution 1986. It contained the following terse 
statement: 
That the Canadian Naval Regulations provide 
that personnel entered in the naval service must 
be of the white race; 
That the Army and Air Force are accepting for 
Active Service personnel of any racial origin; 
That it is essential that the Canadian Naval 
Service adopt a similar policy.14 
The attached naval draft order required that, 
".. .any male British subject of any racial origin 
may be entered for the period of hostilities in the 
Canadian Naval Forces."15 It is not clear what 
had changed since 1941 when the "Jim Crow 
Law," as it was known, had been justified because 
of the different circumstances of Canada 's small 
ship navy.16 Regardless, during the last two years 
of the war, the RCN officially accepted applicants 
of any racial origin, including First Nations. 
The numbers of Native men to see service in 
the Navy is unknown. What is certain is that some 
did see service even before the "colour line" was 
dropped. Fred Gaff en mentions one First Nations 
man who, already enroled in the Royal Canadian 
Naval Volunteer Reserve before the war began, 
joined the ru sh of reserves at the first call up.1 7 
Others were able to enlist either th rough the 
ignorance or the collusion of superior officers and 
fellow ratings. It is not clear whether Aboriginal 
applicants were enroled in greater numbers after 
1943, although a report from the Army Historical 
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Section suggests that the Navy maintained its 
"colour line" in practice.18 However, this report 
gave no s u b s t a n t i v e evidence for s u c h an 
assertion. While it is reasonable to assume that 
there would have been unofficial resistance to the 
change in policy, in the absence of convincing 
proof, any allegations of systematic and organised 
retention of the " colour line" mus t be treated with 
scepticism. In spite of its belated change of policy, 
however, the RCN was clearly not an accessible 
option for the majority of Aboriginal recruits 
during the Second World War. 
The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), on the 
other hand , proved a slightly more hospitable 
place for Natives than the RCN. The RCAF also 
had racial restrictions on recruitment when the 
war broke out, b u t very quickly exempted First 
Nations applicants from this ruling. As a result, 
more Native men saw service in the RCAF than 
the Navy. However, despite the lack of an overt 
racial b a n on Native enl is tment , there were 
tangible barr iers in the form of high education 
requirements and stringent heal th s tandards . 
Thus, while more significant than Naval service, 
only a small minority of the Aboriginal men who 
served during the war did so in the RCAF. 
Prior to the war, the RCAF had maintained a 
"colour line" more strict t han that of the RCN. 
The conditions of entry then stated that: 
All candidates must be British subjects and of 
pure European descent. They must also be the 
sons of parents both of whom are (or, if deceased, 
were at the time of death) British subjects or 
naturalised British subjects. Where there is 
doubt of nationality or descent, the burden of 
proof will rest upon the candidate.19 
These regulations echoed almost verbatim the 
conditions of service required by Britain's Royal 
Air Force (RAF) in early 1939.20 Like the RCN, 
the RCAF would be closely integrated with the 
RAF in case of a major conflict, and this required 
the harmonisa t ion of policies in a number of 
areas , including personnel . Unlike the RCN, 
however, the RCAF altered its regulations early 
in the conflict. 
The Chief of the Air Staff received an enquiry 
from the Officer in Charge (OIC) of Montreal's 
r e c r u i t i n g c e n t r e in mid -November 1939 , 
r e g a r d i n g the a c c e p t a n c e of a "coloured" 
applicant. Flying Officer J. H. Hollies, acting for 
the Chief of the Air Staff, replied, "I am directed 
to advise that enlisted applicants mus t be of pure 
European descent with the exception of the North 
A m e r i c a n I n d i a n s . " 2 1 The m o t i v a t i o n for 
specifically accepting "North American Indians" 
is unclear. No ment ion of it h a s been found 
elsewhere, and it is not certain when it came into 
effect; but from November 1939, no racially based 
regulations barred First Nations applicants from 
service in the RCAF. The Air Service jet t isoned 
the "colour line" completely in September 1942.22 
The road to Air Force enl is tment remained, 
nevertheless, a difficult one for Canada 's young 
Native men. The health s tandards maintained by 
the RCAF early in the war were rigorous and 
caused the rejection of many recruits, Aboriginal 
or otherwise. Each candidate had to be physically 
fit and underwent three medical examinat ions 
before reaching elementary flight school.23 The 
h e a l t h examina t i ons s e a r c h e d for s igns of 
communicable diseases as well as any minor 
deficiencies in blood pressure , hear t action and 
vision.24 A glance at the Indian Affairs Annual 
Report for any year between the wars will indicate 
the serious deficiencies in the health of Canada's 
Aboriginal population. For those at tempting to 
enlist in the RCAF, the consequences of outbreaks 
of various diseases during the interwar period 
were significant. Tuberculosis and trachoma, in 
particular, increased Native chances of rejection: 
the former because i t sp read readily in the 
conditions of military living, and the latter because 
of its damaging effect on eyesight.25 Health 
s tandards , however, along with the age limits, 
were eventually relaxed as the RCAF came under 
increasing pressure to fill its personnel quotas 
for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. 
Many able-bodied Aboriginal men were also 
rejected because they lacked the required level of 
education. The pre-war regulations continued to 
be enforced for the first two years of the war. 
Applicants for pilot training mus t have completed 
junior matriculation, equivalent to grade twelve 
in Ontario and British Columbia and grade eleven 
elsewhere, before they could be considered.26 Few 
Aboriginal applicants were able to meet this 
criterion. During the twenties and thirties, when 
most of these recruits had attended school, over 
75 per cent of the country 's Native children 
a t t a ined only a grade one to th ree level of 
education.2 7 The RCAF encouraged those who 
were physically able bu t short on education to 
11 
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return to school. However, in 1941, the emphasis 
shifted from actual to potential academic ability, 
because the old p lan had failed to generate the 
n u m b e r of aircrew required. The recrui t ing 
p rocess swi tched to ap t i tude and learning-
capacity tests. Those whose test scores were high, 
b u t who lacked adequate schooling received 
supplemental education while in the service.28 A 
s c h e m e t h a t did no t a u t o m a t i c a l l y reject 
a p p l i c a n t s w i t h o u t j u n i o r m a t r i c u l a t i o n 
u n d o u b t e d l y w o r k e d to t he a d v a n t a g e of 
Aboriginal recrui ts . The result was a higher 
n u m b e r of Natives in RCAF ranks t h a n was the 
case in the RCN, bu t still only a small segment of 
the total number of First Nations service men.29 
In part as a result of the difficulty Aboriginals 
faced in enlisting in the RCN and RCAF, the Army 
was the b r a n c h in which the overwhelming 
majority of Native men served. Another factor that 
accounts for the concentrat ion of Aboriginal 
service in the Army was its huge demand for 
personnel . In addition, this may have been the 
preferred choice for Aboriginal men inspired by 
the example of the approximately 3,500 Native 
Army veterans of the First World War.30 The Army 
did not officially block Aboriginal recruitment, 
and generally applications were accepted without 
incident. However, it should not be assumed that 
these policies were administered uniformly or that 
the Army was especially eager for First Nations 
recruits. 
The Indian Affairs Branch received a number 
of r e p o r t s , from va r ious po in t s in Br i t i sh 
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario 
du r ing 1941 a n d 1942, of Army recru i te rs 
refusing Native applications. These incidents were 
the resul t of individual initiative on the par t of 
local and district recruiting officers. 
T.R.L. Maclnnes, Secretary of Indian Affairs, 
received the first disturbing report from Robert 
Howe, the Indian agent at Vanderhoof, British 
Columbia, in April 1941. Howe's letter primarily 
c o n c e r n e d itself wi th o the r b u s i n e s s , b u t 
mentioned in pass ing that , "...the Recruiting 
Officer for the District h a s instruct ions not to 
enlist Indians for any branch of the Army."31 The 
agent 's comment d r e w ' a p rompt reply from 
Maclnnes, who requested a report concerning the 
matter.32 Howe contacted Major R. L. Gale, the 
Recruiting Officer at Prince George, who, "... 
s ta ted tha t he had been instructed not to enlist 
12 
I n d i a n s a t the p r e s e n t t ime." 3 3 The agen t 
presumed that this alluded to all Aboriginals, at 
least in Recruiting Area H (Prince George), and 
referred the Secretary to Gale's at tached letter.34 
Unfortunately, this letter did not clarify the origin 
of these supposed orders. A report sent from the 
agent at Bella Coola, British Columbia, in October 
of that year would suggest that this reticence was 
still in effect and wider in scope than jus t Prince 
George. A recruiting officer passing through Bella 
Coola informed the agent that, "the Army was not 
very keen on Indian recruits."3 5 Despite the 
apparent difficulties and res is tance from some 
of the mili tary recru i te rs , over 250 Bri t ish 
Columbia Native men successfully enlisted.36 
The most serious and systemic problem arose 
in Military District 10, in February of 1942.37 The 
initial news received by the Indian Affairs Branch 
was a report from the Indian agent at Kenora, 
Ontario, who forwarded some correspondence he 
had initiated with the local recruiting officer. The 
recruit ing officer in conversation with Major 
Garton, the District Recruiting Officer, had tried 
to "point out the good work done by our Indians 
during the last war, bu t apparently, he [Garton] 
is acting on instruct ions from Ottawa in this 
connection."38 A copy of the District Recruiting 
Order tha t h a d inaugura ted the inquiry was 
enclosed: 
Indians also present a difficult problem. Out of 
seven Indians who had had six months training 
and were boarded for a recent draft, six were 
boarded out for T. B. and had to be discharged. 
Experience has shown that Indians cannot stand 
confinement or training, and their application 
should not be accepted.39 
Such a clear b a n on native recrui tment soon 
generated more incidents in other parts of Military 
District 10. 
A telegram from Tom Lamb in The Pas , 
Manitoba, to the Indian Affairs Branch claimed 
that there were 56 men at Mooselake who wanted 
to enlist.40 This group, comprised of Métis and 
Native men between the ages of 18 and 45, h a d 
contacted Military District 10, bu t their "reception 
[was] not encouraging."4 1 A similar scenar io 
occurred at Norway House, Manitoba, where Dr. 
Corrigan, an Indian Affairs medical official, h a d 
found "a good many Indians who are physically 
fit and desirous of joining the army."42 However, 
like those at Mooselake, these men received an 
5
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Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard 
Montgomery investing Corporal 
H.E. Brant of the Hastings and 
Prince Edward Regiment with 
the Military Medal, Catanzaro, 
Italy, 13 September 1943. 
(Photo by Captain Frank 
Royal, NAC PA 130065) 
unhelpful response from Major Garton. Corrigan 
did not accept Garton's concerns about a high 
incidence of tuberculosis after training as a valid 
reason for refusing Native enlistment. He believed 
that these men were improperly examined before 
enlistment, as a simple chest X-ray would have 
revealed the existence of the disease.4 3 The 
repeated refusal to enlist Aboriginals in Military 
District 10 finally provoked some action by the 
Indian Affairs Branch. 
On 19 May 1942, Dr. Harold W. McGill, 
Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 
passed on a memorandum to the Deputy Minister 
of Mines and Resources notifying him of the 
situation.4 4 Three days later the minister, T. A. 
Crerar, contacted his colleague in the Ministry of 
Na t iona l Defence, J . L. Ra l s ton , wi th t he 
expectation that he would inquire into the matter 
further.45 Ralston immediately issued instructions 
for a mobile recruiting unit to visit Moose Lake.46 
The r ec ru i t e r s examined over 40 m e n and 
accepted only two. They were shipped to Winnipeg 
where both were eventually rejected.47 Whether 
this remarkably high rejection rate reflected 
informal opposition to Natives in the Army or 
legitimate health concerns is unclear. 
Despite incidents across British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario, where 
recruit ing officers d i s suaded or even denied 
Natives the privilege of submitting an application, 
it is unlikely that there was a general Army order 
blocking their recruitment. The fact tha t the 
Indian Affairs Branch received no information 
about other incidents in other parts of the country 
suggests that the occurrences recorded were local 
in na ture . More importantly, the very fact tha t 
thousands of Native men did successfully enlist 
and serve makes the existence of a nation-wide 
official barrier to Aboriginal enlistment in Army 
recruiting policy highly suspect. 
While there is no evidence to support a claim 
tha t the orders blocking Aboriginal recrui tment 
originated in Ottawa, the Army was clearly not 
eager to enlist Natives. In 1944, the recruiting 
m a n u a l c o n t a i n e d a s p e c i a l n o t e on t h e 
"Enlistment of Indians and Half Breeds."48 The 
note stated that: 
Care should be taken when accepting 
applications from or approaching Indians as 
prospective recruits. Here education standards 
are strictly adhered to. Experience has shown 
that they cannot stand long periods of 
13 
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c o n f i n e m e n t , d i sc ip l ine a n d t h e s t r e n u o u s 
phys i ca l a n d n e r v o u s d e m a n d inc iden ta l t o 
m o d e r n a r m y rout ine . On the other h a n d , some 
very fine I n d i a n s have b e e n enl is ted, b u t t he se 
are usual ly persons who have h a d their schooling 
a n d t r a in ing in an Ind ian Resident ia l School.4 9 
T h u s , t he Army w a s no t c losed to Native 
enlistment. Its attitude might be more accurately 
described as cautiously pessimistic concerning 
Aboriginal applicants. In this respect, Native men 
were in a more advantageous position than other 
minorities such as Japanese , Chinese and Indo-
Canadians who were largely blocked from all 
mi l i ta ry service. 5 0 Desp i te the difficulties, 
t housands of First Nations people fought and 
laboured in the Army during the Second World 
War. 
* * * * * 
The s t ructure of First Nations military service in the Second World War in many ways 
resembled closely the s t ructure during the First 
World War, w h e n all h a d s e r v e d i n t h e 
considerable ground forces of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force. The na tu re and variety of 
Aboriginal service might have differed greatly in 
the Second World War, due to the large Canadian 
air and naval forces that had not existed in the 
F i r s t World War. However , a s h a s b e e n 
demonstrated, recruitment restrictions based on 
race, education and health largely eliminated the 
other services as viable options for Aboriginal 
applicants. Usually, Native desires to enlist could 
find an outlet only in an Army recruiting centre. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that once In the 
Army, RCN, or RCAF, Native soldiers were treated 
as equals by their peers in a way they had never 
been before or since. Presumably, when lives were 
on the line, a man ' s skill and ability mattered 
more t h a n his ethnic heritage, something that 
policy makers seemingly did not understand. This 
is mere supposit ion at this point. More work 
needs to be done on the military service of 
Aboriginal men before any conclusions can be 
drawn about the actual experiences of Native 
soldiers. In the end, despite the overt racial bans, 
the less tangible barriers of education and health 
standards, and official trepidation about the value 
of recruiting First Nations men, thousands served, 
h u n d r e d s lost their lives, and all of them made 
an important contribution to Canada's war effort. 
14 
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